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Legitimacy as an assessment
of existing legal standards:
The case of the 2003 Iraq war
Charlotte Ku
Introduction: Legitimacy and legality
Power, legality and legitimacy are all crucial to a rule-based international
order. Politics is the mechanism that maintains an appropriate tension
and balance between these elements.1 International institutions provide
the structure for pursuing politics and provide the means to transmit the
outcomes and decisions. The 2003 war in Iraq caused widespread concern
about the future ability of the international order to regulate the use of
force because the war appeared to push legality aside with a decision
both to exercise power and to bypass the most widely recognized source
of authority for such action, the UN Security Council. But why did the
war in Iraq cause such concern when neither the exertion of power nor
the sidestepping of the UN Security Council is new? The answer can
probably be found in today’s international power structure.
With the end of the Cold War, the United States became the world’s
only superpower. This role created both new responsibilities as well as
new opportunities. But the US failure to send a clear multilateralist sig-
nal to the world created concern that nothing would or could restrain
this superpower. This concern was fuelled by the US rejection of major
international agreements such as the Mine Ban Treaty, the Kyoto Proto-
col to the Climate Change Convention, and the Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court. Yet, despite the harsh rhetoric, there is little to
indicate that, in fact, the United States wishes to operate without re-
straint, even the restraint of the existing UN collective security frame-
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work. But has the United States embarked on a course of no return with
regard to the UN security system following the 2003 Iraq war? Not so far,
and one way to measure how far the United States has strayed from the
existing system may be to assess the legitimacy of its actions.
On the eve of the US-led war in Iraq, Anne-Marie Slaughter published
a controversial opinion piece in the New York Times in which she noted:
‘‘By giving up on the Security Council, the Bush administration has
started on a course that could be called ‘illegal but legitimate,’ a course
that could end up, paradoxically, winning United Nations approval for a
military campaign in Iraq – though only after an invasion.’’ She con-
cluded the piece on a tentative note: ‘‘Overall, everyone involved is still
playing by the rules. But depending on what we find in Iraq, the rules
may have to evolve, so that which is legitimate is also legal.’’2 Legitimacy
in the case of Iraq depended heavily on what was found.
One year later, she wrote:
A year ago, when the U.S. and Britain decided to send troops to Iraq without a
second UN resolution, I argued that their action was illegal under international
law but potentially legitimate in the eyes of the international community. I set
forth three criteria for determining the ultimate legitimacy of the action: 1)
whether the coalition forces did in fact find weapons of mass destruction; 2)
whether coalition forces were welcomed by the Iraqi people; and 3) whether the
U.S. and Britain turned back to the UN as quickly as possible after the fighting
was done. A year later, I conclude that the invasion was both illegal and illegiti-
mate. The coalition’s decision to use force without a second Security Council res-
olution cannot stand as a precedent for future action, but rather as a mistake that
should lead us back to genuine multilateralism.3
Although UN Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003) authorizing UN
involvement in post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building in Iraq
brought the United Nations back into the picture, Slaughter’s conclusion
was that, because of the failure to meet what she outlined as the tests of
legitimacy, the action taken in Iraq cannot be regarded as a precedent for
future such actions. But had the tests been met, what would legitimacy
have provided? It would have provided grounds for post hoc UN ap-
proval and it might have served as a precedent for future action. Slaugh-
ter’s initial assertion that the war might be legitimate was controversial
enough, but what seemed particularly difficult for many to accept was
her view that ‘‘overall, everyone involved is still playing by the rules’’.
Perhaps the sentence should have read that, ‘‘overall, everyone involved
is still trying to play by the rules’’, but that ‘‘the rules may have to evolve,
so that which is legitimate is also legal’’. This conclusion accepts that a
gap between legitimacy and legality cannot exist indefinitely and that, if
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a case can be made for the legitimacy of an otherwise illegal action, this
may indicate that the rule needs to be changed. Considerations of legiti-
macy therefore are crucial to the functioning of the law even when legal-
ity and legitimacy diverge.
Nevertheless, the war in Iraq triggered much concern that basing an
action on legitimacy, even though it was illegal, would lead to self-serving
unilateral judgements whenever multilateral authorization was not avail-
able. Yet, can a nation realistically be expected to wait for a collective
decision if it feels under threat? Slaughter addressed this problem in her
March 2003 New York Times article: ‘‘The United Nations imposes con-
straints on both the global decision-making process and the outcomes of
the process, constraints that all countries recognize to be in their long-
term interest and the interest of the world. But it cannot be a straitjacket,
preventing nations from defending themselves or pursuing what they per-
ceive to be their vital national security interests.’’4 The larger question is
whether alternatives existed that might have been more acceptable to the
collective body. The failure to explore such alternatives fully (in the opin-
ion of most voices outside the United States) is perhaps the key problem
in arguing the legitimacy of the war. A further problem is the ripple ef-
fect that the US action might have on the entire UN security system by
tempting others to follow the US example and act without specific UN
authorization.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan addressed this concern in his charge
to the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2003:
The past year has shaken the foundations of collective security and undermined
confidence in the possibility of collective responses to our common problems and
challenges. It has also brought to the fore deep divergences of opinion on the
range and nature of the challenges we face, and are likely to face in the future.
Specifically, he asked the Panel to:
(a) Examine today’s global threats and provide an analysis of future challenges to
international peace and security. Whilst there may continue to exist a diversity of
perception on the relative importance of the various threats facing particular
Member States on an individual basis, it is important to find an appropriate bal-
ance at a global level. It is also important to understand the connections between
different threats.5
Whether we individually conclude that the 2003 war in Iraq was legal or
illegal, the question is whether the UN Security Council system can re-
spond effectively and retain its ‘‘unique standard of international legal le-
gitimacy’’.6
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The central role of the United Nations Security Council
In 2000, the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations appointed by the
UN Secretary-General concluded that ‘‘the United Nations does not wage
war. Where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been en-
trusted to coalitions of willing States, with the authorization of the Secu-
rity Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.’’7 This is how the
United Nations was envisaged to work. ‘‘Instead of being a substitute for
great powers, [the United Nations] was designed to depend on them.’’8
The great powers were to provide the means for the United Nations to
carry out its decisions. But this created a reliance on strong military
powers and an expectation that these powers would act within the con-
fines of the UN community’s interpretation of the scope of an authoriza-
tion. The effort to institute international control or oversight over the use
of national military assets is one of the less developed parts of the UN
security system. At the same time, relying on one or two large military
powers has caused much of the UN membership concern. The views of
UN scholar Ramesh Thakur well express this point of view:
there has been a perceptible undercurrent of unease since the end of the Cold
War that the will of the UNSC has been bent too easily and too often to the
wishes of the sole superpower. . . . Developing countries fear that in some sections
of the west today, the view has gained ground that anyone but the legitimate au-
thorities can use force. If this is then used as an alibi to launch UN-authorized
humanitarian interventions against the wishes of the legitimate governments of
member states, the international organization would quickly be viewed more as
a threat to the security of many countries than as a source of protection against
major-power predators.9
In the post-1945 world, the UN Security Council plays a central role in
determining both the legality and the legitimacy of uses of force. This was
recognized by US President George W. Bush in his address to the UN
General Assembly on 12 September 2002.
The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations,
and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade
of defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and
defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced,
or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of
its founding, or will it be irrelevant?10
Although the questions are pertinent, the course ultimately chosen by
President Bush to force Iraq’s compliance is one that has increasingly
been regarded as premature and beyond the scope of the authorization
400 CHARLOTTE KU
of any UN Security Council mandate. This difference in view is at the
heart of the disagreement about the legality of the 2003 war in Iraq. The
United States acted alone when it became clear that no UN Security
Council resolution authorizing additional action would be forthcoming,
following France’s declaration that it would veto any such resolution.
US authorities, however, argued that there was adequate authority in ex-
isting UN Security Council Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441.
The United States’ close ally, the United Kingdom, concurred, as ex-
pressed by the UK Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, who provided
the following legal basis for the use of force against Iraq:
Authority to use force against Iraq exists from the combined effect of resolutions
678, 687 and 1441. All of these resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter which allows the use of force for the express purpose of restoring
international peace and security.11
The British government’s interpretation was that ‘‘Resolution 1441 would
in terms have provided that a further decision of the Security Council to
sanction force was required if that had been intended. Thus, all that
resolution 1441 requires is reporting to and discussion by the Security
Council of Iraq’s failures, but not an express further decision to authorise
force.’’12
Australia’s Attorney General and the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade also agreed that ‘‘deployment of Australian forces to Iraq
and subsequent action by those forces would be consistent with interna-
tional law’’. The opinion was based on the authority of existing UN Secu-
rity Council resolutions ‘‘directed towards disarming Iraq of weapons of
mass destruction and restoring international peace and security to the
area. This existing authority for the use of force would only be negated
in current circumstances if the Security Council were to pass a resolution
that required Member States to refrain from the use of force against
Iraq.’’13
Iraq in 2002 raised the question of how to deal with threats that have
the potential for widespread deadly effects but that have not yet materi-
alized. This led to the debate over whether undertaking ‘‘regime change’’
in Iraq without specific international authorization to do so could be legal.
In November 2002, the Legal Adviser of the US Department of State,
William H. Taft IV, outlined the changing character of self-defence and
the possible need to rethink the rules governing self-defence. He noted
that the question of when self-defence could be exercised was not new
and he cited President John F. Kennedy’s observation during the Cuban
Missile Crisis in 1962: ‘‘We no longer live in a world where only the actual
firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to
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constitute maximum peril.’’14 But what constitutes ‘‘a sufficient chal-
lenge’’, and who can be the judge of this in the absence of a determina-
tion by the UN Security Council? Who is responsible and accountable for
determining the appropriateness of action taken? This is the crux of the
problem related to the legality of the war in Iraq. And, in a world threat-
ened by terrorists and in which the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction is virtually inevitable, the question will not go away.
The answers to the question of who can decide to act in the specific
case of Iraq vary. The differences turn on the amount of reliance placed
on UN Security Council Resolutions 678 (1991) and 1441 (2002), which
were to regulate Iraq’s disarmament programme. William Howard Taft
IV argued that these resolutions provided sufficient authority: ‘‘Resolu-
tion 1441 . . . gave Iraq a final opportunity to comply, but stated specifi-
cally that violations of the obligations . . . would constitute a further
material breach. . . . Iraq has clearly committed such violations, and ac-
cordingly, the authority to use force to address Iraq’s material breaches
is clear.’’15
At the same time, Anne-Marie Slaughter noted that ‘‘a large majority
of specialists in international law believe explicit Security Council author-
ization is required to confer legality on such a military campaign’’.16 A
letter to the Guardian signed by 16 professors of international law ex-
pressed the problem: ‘‘Before military action can lawfully be undertaken
against Iraq, the Security Council must have indicated its clearly ex-
pressed assent. It has not yet done so.’’17 Among official views that the
war in Iraq was illegal, the view of the Russian Federation is a good ex-
ample: ‘‘As the legal basis for the military action against Iraq references
are made to Security Council Resolutions 678 (1990), 687 (1991), 1441
(2002). In our view the above-mentioned resolutions considered in their
entirety and in combination with other resolutions on Iraq, official state-
ments of States on their interpretation and provisions of the UN Charter
which were the basis for their adoption, show that the Security Council
did not authorize Member States in this case to use force against Iraq.’’18
Among those who did not share the majority academic view was Chris-
topher Greenwood, who wrote that ‘‘limited and proportionate action
may be taken in self-defense if and when an armed attack is reasonably
believed to be imminent’’.19 Ruth Wedgwood also dissented from the
academic majority, basing her reasoning on existing UN resolutions on
Iraq:
The founding legal framework for action against Iraq remains intact and available
to those who are willing to use it. Resolution 687 is the mother of all resolutions,
setting out the requirements for post-Gulf-war Iraq. This 1991 resolution re-
quires, in perpetuity, that Iraq give up its weapons of mass destruction and permit
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verification . . . Resolution 687 designates Iraq’s acceptance of this requirement as
a continuing condition of the Gulf war ceasefire. Teeth are also supplied by reso-
lution 678, authorizing the allies to expel Iraq from Kuwait and to use force in
support of all ‘‘subsequent relevant resolutions’’ needed to restore regional peace
and security.20
The key point of contention is whether these resolutions authorized
the use of force in the case of an Iraqi failure to comply with their provi-
sions. Those opposing the war argued, first, that the resolutions did not
authorize the use of force, and then that the renewed programme of arms
inspections had begun to meet the objective of disarming Iraq. The US
and UK position was that, short of immediate and complete compliance
with the disarmament provisions of Resolution 687, regime change was
needed in order to ensure stability and peace in the region and, indeed,
in the world. In remarks to the UN General Assembly on 12 September
2002, President George W. Bush said:
With every step the Iraq regime takes toward gaining and deploying the most ter-
rible weapons, our own options to confront that regime will narrow. And if an
emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to terrorist allies, then the at-
tacks of September the 11th would be a prelude to far greater horrors.21
Although relying on UN Security Council Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441
as the bases for action, President Bush also based his action on the ‘‘sov-
ereign authority [of the United States] to use force in assuring its own na-
tional security’’.22 This latter point, coupled with the present power of
the US military, has caused worldwide concern about whether the United
States intends to break away from the UN security system that it helped
to create after World War II in order to address other ‘‘deviant states’’
that it might regard as a threat to its own or the world’s security. Joseph
Nye wrote that the reason for thinking about preventive war is ‘‘the fear
. . . that certain deviant states, such as Iraq and North Korea, might be-
come enablers of . . . terrorist groups’’ seeking now to privatize war.23
But where does all this lead us in the long term? Does it lead to more
wars of the type we saw waged in Iraq? Does this spell the end of the
UN system seeking to restrain the use of force, which has been in place
since 1945?
The consensus remains strong in the United States – despite foreign
scepticism – that it needs multilateral frameworks. It needs them to ad-
dress the broad range of issues and areas that it knows have transnational
implications. And it needs them perhaps even more urgently in areas
where the international standard is not yet clear. One of the harshest
critics of US policy, former French Foreign Minister Dominique de
Villepin, put it well when he noted:
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Legitimacy . . . is the key to the effectiveness of international action. If we want to
develop the right answers to the challenges of the modern world and to take ap-
propriate measures – including the use of force – we must do so with the authority
of collective decisions.24
The present urgent international task is therefore to maintain a multi-
lateral structure within which states can disagree. As with any political
contest, winners and losers in a situation must maintain sufficient com-
mon purpose and interest to make it possible to work together in the
future. Power disparities may present a special problem when the dis-
agreement is with the most powerful member or members of the system.
Nevertheless, the United Nations’ history during the Cold War demon-
strates that this can be done. Sidestepping certain disputes comes at the
price of removing some conflicts from the United Nations’ field of re-
sponsibility. But, as the end of the Cold War showed, having the institu-
tion available and capable when political conditions are right for it to
play a more active role is also important and should not be overlooked –
not by the United States and not by critics of the United States. Although
there is a serious disagreement among the most important UN members,
all have a stake in maintaining a security role for the United Nations and
should be careful not to destroy it.
The war in Iraq and its aftermath pose a serious challenge to the UN
system, but the system thus far still remains. Whether that system will
be effective in addressing the security concerns of the future will depend
on whether UN members are willing to work with each other to make
it so.
Establishing legitimacy
In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty initiated by the Canadian government noted that, although linked,
legality and legitimacy were not synonymous and that legitimacy takes on
increased significance when the law is unsettled.25 But what happens if
the chief source of legitimacy happens to be the same body that confers
international legality on an action but finds that it can provide neither le-
gality nor legitimacy? This was the case with the 2003 Iraq war, since the
UN Security Council declined explicitly to authorize the war in Iraq,
making the war illegal in the eyes of many. And are we on the verge of
facing more such cases where the United Nations is unwilling to autho-
rize action but some state or group of states nevertheless feels compelled
to act? The 2003 Iraq war was not the first time this question arose.
Under very different conditions, but addressing the United Nations’
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failure to act in Rwanda in the wake of the 1999 Operation Allied Force
in Kosovo, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked:
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the
use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might say: leave
Kosovo aside for a moment, and think about Rwanda. Imagine for one moment
that, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, there had been a
coalition of states ready and willing to act in defence of the Tutsi population, but
the council had refused or delayed giving the green light. Should such a coalition
then have stood idly by while the horror unfolded?
To those for whom the Kosovo action heralded a new era when states and
groups of states can take military action outside the established mechanisms for
enforcing international law, one might equally ask: Is there not a danger of such
interventions undermining the imperfect, yet resilient security system created
after the second world war, and of setting dangerous precedents for future inter-
ventions without a clear criterion to decide who might invoke these precedents
and in what circumstances?26
The dilemma the Secretary-General posed about the adequacy of the UN
security system to respond to security concerns unforeseen by the Char-
ter’s founders is a crucial one and existed before the questions raised by
the 2003 Iraq war. A rigid requirement of Security Council authorization
for military forces to be used legally could preclude, and has precluded,
their use when morality and international law would otherwise seem to
require it, as in humanitarian emergencies. On the other hand, authoriza-
tion of the use of military force on an ad hoc basis by bodies or groups of
states other than the Security Council or action taken by a single state
put at risk the decision-making structure of the present international se-
curity system. Since NATO’s actions in 1999, for example, new claims to
be a legitimate source of authorization have already been made, notably
in 2000 by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
which adopted a protocol explicitly stating that the ECOWAS Council
could authorize the use of military force even without a Security Council
mandate.27
Concern over possible unregulated intervention based on the judge-
ment of a small but powerful number of states caused the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty to insist on objective
evidence of a conscience-shocking situation and the conception of a ‘‘re-
sponsibility to protect’’ rather than a ‘‘right to intervene’’. The Commis-
sion’s work was guided by ‘‘a clear indication that the tools, devices and
thinking of international relations need now to be comprehensively reas-
sessed, in order to meet the foreseeable needs of the 21st century’’.28 The
Commission’s report continued that any new approach needed to meet at
least four basic objectives:
LEGITIMACY AS AN ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL STANDARDS 405
 to establish clearer rules, procedures and criteria for determining whether,
when and how to intervene;
 to establish the legitimacy of military intervention when necessary and after all
other approaches have failed;
 to ensure that military intervention, when it occurs, is carried out only for the
purposes proposed, is effective, and is undertaken with proper concern to min-
imize the human costs and institutional damage that will result; and
 to help eliminate, where possible, the causes of conflict while enhancing the
prospects for durable and sustainable peace.29
The Commission further noted that: ‘‘In the face of legal ambiguity, lists
of possible thresholds and criteria assume increasing importance. The es-
tablishment of a set of criteria has been offered as one way to mitigate
the potential for abuse. While not legally binding, they could neverthe-
less provide a benchmark against which the legitimacy of an intervention
could be measured.’’30
These criteria produce useful general standards by which to judge any
claim to legitimate action. They seek to maintain order through rules,
procedures and criteria even when such existing standards somehow
proved inadequate. They accept the concept of necessity, although only
when all alternatives have been exhausted.31 They apply the just war
standard of acting only where there is a likelihood of success in meeting
the objectives stated. And, finally, they maintain a focus on supporting
durable solutions and institutional structures over pursuing specific na-
tional objectives and interests. These criteria well state the tests that can
be applied to actions taken outside of the generally accepted frameworks
for authorizing action and may provide the conditions necessary to con-
sider legitimate an action that otherwise fails to meet existing legal stan-
dards. Given these conditions, it would appear that legitimacy can often
be determined only after the action has taken place if the conditions that
triggered action are not observable prior to acting. This is, of course,
where persuasive and credible intelligence becomes important.
Yet, even though no weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq,
the threat of such weapons finding their way into terrorist networks re-
mains. Are there any standards of legitimacy that might aid in addressing
such threats if existing rules and institutions appear unable to respond?
One such effort was advanced by Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaugh-
ter in the idea of a ‘‘duty to prevent’’. This would apply under the follow-
ing conditions:
First, [the duty to prevent] seeks to control not only the proliferation of WMD
but also the people who possess them. Second, it emphasizes prevention, calling
on the international community to act early in order to be effective and develop a
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menu of potential measures aimed at particular governments – especially mea-
sures that can be taken well short of any use of force. Third, the duty to prevent
should be exercised collectively, through a global or regional organization.32
Again, if we put the above criteria to the test, we find that they empha-
size alternatives to the use of force and address the problem of prolifera-
tion in ways that try to bring the action back into a multilateral setting.
Should the international community fail to act through the United Na-
tions or some other widely recognized body, capable states, alone or with
allies, may be compelled to act to prevent harm from coming to their citi-
zens and others for whom they are responsible. As suggested by the re-
sponsibility to protect, the duty to prevent also begins from the premise
that individual states are responsible for the security and well-being of
their populations. However, in the case of the responsibility to protect,
states from the outside may have to act against a state that is abusing its
population, whereas, in the duty to prevent, a state may have to act to
protect its population from a potential outside threat.
The duty to prevent is also a reaction to possible threats posed by
closed societies developing weapons of mass destruction and lacking any
internal political checks on the actions of a despotic regime. The duty to
prevent seeks to legitimate early action to prevent mass murder through
the use of WMD. It attempts to establish criteria in order to determine
the existence of a threat so that the difficulty of mounting evidence to
support a response prior to an attack is overcome. If a threat is imminent,
international law allows pre-emptive action. However, in a world of
weapons of mass destruction and technology, the time available for re-
sponse once a threat materializes may be very short, rendering the classic
approach to pre-emptive action insufficient. As described in the National
Security Strategy of the United States of America in September 2002: ‘‘We
must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objec-
tives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to at-
tack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. In-
stead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of
mass destruction – weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered cov-
ertly, and used without warning.’’33
At the same time, as we have seen from the current war in Iraq, if war
is waged on such a pre-emptive basis, then evidence to justify such a war
is essential to maintain support for such war efforts on three levels: by
citizens in states that wage the war, by the population in the affected
state, and by the international community. Whatever the merits of re-
moving Saddam Hussein from power, when the United States waged
war in March 2003 on the basis of Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass
destruction, prior to the completion of the UN weapons inspectors’ mis-
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sion and without further authorization of the UN Security Council, it im-
posed a burden to find weapons of mass destruction or evidence of their
production. The failure to do so has eroded support of the effort in the
United States, overseas and within Iraq and has damaged the credibility
of both the Iraqi operation specifically and the general effort to address
the threat described above by the National Security Strategy.
Legitimacy cannot substitute for legality over the long run. Therefore,
if change to the existing system is necessary owing to new conditions and
circumstances, relevant international and domestic institutions need to
reflect seriously on how to address these new circumstances. Failure to
do so will result in the kind of unilateral state response that over time
will dissipate the advances made in multilateral international cooperation
since 1945. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted: ‘‘Whilst there
may continue to exist a diversity of perception on the relative importance
of the various threats facing particular Member States on an individual
basis, it is important to find an appropriate balance at a global level.’’34
Implicit in his view is that a balance needs to be found within the UN sys-
tem itself.
As the International Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty focused on the responsibility of states and the international com-
munity to protect against gross violations of human rights, so is it the re-
sponsibility of states and the international community to protect against
the potential of mass murder through the use of weapons of mass de-
struction. The political tensions created among members of the UN Secu-
rity Council by the war in Iraq demonstrate the complexity of the current
security environment. However, both the legitimate and the legal use of
force require multilateral cooperation. Yet, militarily capable states can
be expected to seek such cooperation only if cooperation will provide
effective responses to threats as they emerge.
Conclusion
In an article titled ‘‘Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the
World Constitutive Process,’’ Michael Reisman wrote:
Actions inconsistent with the procedures prescribed for them may erode the au-
thority of the law and increase the probability of abuse. Hence the law’s ceaseless
quest for organization and institutionalization and its discomfort with and inher-
ent resistance to legally unauthorized actions, no matter how urgent the circum-
stances or morally imperative the impulse.35
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Reisman continued by reflecting on the correlation between ‘‘the ineffec-
tiveness of a political system and the resort to and toleration of unilateral
action: the less effective the system, the more the impulse for and use of
unilateral action and vice versa’’.36 These two observations capture well
the dilemma faced by the present UN security system.
There is great pressure to avoid changing the existing system lest any
effort to improve it result in the destruction of even the modicum of or-
ganization and institutionalization that the UN Charter system now pro-
vides. At the same time, because the political system does not whole-
heartedly embrace this legal framework, the potential for acting outside
the framework increases. This explains why any action that challenges
the basic tenets of the present system is regarded with such hostility. It
triggers a deep worry that each move away from accepted procedure
and standards of conduct may prove to be a step towards no organization
or order at all. Understanding this, however, leaves open the question of
how change can be made in the fragile and fragmented political environ-
ment that is the UN community of states.
Arguments of legality should not cloud assessments of the adequacy of
multilateral institutions to meet ongoing and emerging needs. Though the
tests for legitimacy in Iraq may have proven empty, the questions of se-
curity posed throughout the debate about going to war in Iraq may still
require attention. These issues included that of closed societies subject
to no internal controls developing and brandishing weapons of mass de-
struction. But if this is the concern, then the need should be clearly
spelled out and subjected to legal review. In the case of the 2003 war in
Iraq, there was a widespread view that change of the kind sought by the
United States and its allies in Iraq was not warranted. For those who will
assess these actions in the future, the question will be whether change
was not needed or whether the case for change was poorly made.
US actions may have made any change more difficult, but these actions
should not overshadow efforts to assess the capacity, effectiveness and ac-
countability of the UN Security Council. This assessment goes beyond
Security Council decision-making to its ability to carry out and oversee
the decisions it makes. All of this, however, relies on the members of
the UN Security Council, and particularly its permanent members, to
provide the kind of political system that will decrease the likelihood of
behaviour outside the generally accepted framework of conduct.
It would be wise to recognize that, over time, acting on the basis of
legitimacy without legality will not contribute to orderly international re-
lations, particularly where the bases for state action may not be easily
verifiable. Legitimacy may provide a priori justification where legality is
debatable, but it cannot be used on a routine basis and will normally rest
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on a post bellum consensus on the causes of war, as Slaughter argued. For
such justification to have any credibility, it must be applied carefully, rest-
ing on broadly accepted standards, on clearly articulated needs and on
criteria based as much as possible on objective conditions. The action
must further be subject to outside review, including assessing whether
the stated goals of an operation have been achieved and whether the
conduct of the operation was appropriate and acceptable. Providing a
framework for ongoing interaction between the states that opted to act
and those that did not is particularly important at a time of change when
existing standards may be in flux.
Understanding the differences between legality and legitimacy may
provide an immediate answer on whether or not permanent change is re-
quired where the existing framework appears inadequate. Whatever the
answer, states must work to bring legitimacy and legality back together
following any significant episode of acting outside the framework. How-
ever, this can happen only if institutions are willing and able to recognize
new needs and to respond to them. As the debate over humanitarian in-
tervention demonstrated, the credibility of the UN system rests not just
on how effectively it can constrain its members but also, and perhaps
more significantly, on how well it can enable states to take appropriate
preventive and other measures to forestall threats to peace and security.
Under the influence of globalization, the speed with which threats can
materialize and the scope of the damage that can be done have increased.
The ability of states to stave off such attacks will need to adapt at a com-
parable pace, and this may include the adaptation of the institutions they
rely on to provide security both for prevention and for protection.
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